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Petitioner ("Sam Oil") filed a Motion to Strike the brief of 
Respondent Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining (the "Board") 
supported by Sam Oil's Reply Brief. The Board and Respondent BHP 
Petroleum (Americas), Inc. ("BHP") responded by memorandum. 
Following oral argument on February 4, 1991# the Court requested 
that Sam Oil and the Board submit further briefs on the issue of 
the Board's standing. Sam Oil submits this Supplemental Brief 
pursuant to that request. 
X^ _ U.R.A.P. 14(a) DOES NOT GRANT THE BOARD STANDING, 
Although Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(a) requires that 
the agency be named as a respondent, it does not grant the agency 
the right to actively participate in the briefing and argument of 
every petition for review of its decisions. As noted in Sam Oil's 
Reply Brief and admitted in the Board's memorandum, administrative 
agencies that act in a judicial capacity do not have standing to 
actively participate in appeals of their decisions. Sam Oil Reply 
Brief at 2; Board Memorandum at 1 and 2. U.R.A.P. 14(a) does not 
confer standing on the Board. It only requires that the Board be 
named as a respondent. 
Utah's appellate rules are modeled after the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 14(a). 
Federal Rule 15(a) is identical to U.R.A.P. 14 (a). ("In each case 
the agency shall be named respondent.") Accordingly, authority 
1 
interpreting and applying the similar federal rule is helpful in 
interpreting and applying the state rule. 
In McCord v. Benefits Review Board, 514 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 
1975), the Court of Appeals acted upon the motion of the Board of 
Review to dismiss it as a party to an appeal of its decision. The 
Board of Review was established under the Longshoremen' s and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., a federal 
workers' compensation actf to adjudicate claims brought by 
employees and survivors. The McCord Court disregarded the "literal 
applicability" of F.R.A.P. 15(a) and found that the Board was not 
required to be a party simply because it was to be named as a 
respondent. Instead of a literal application, the Court held that 
F.R.A.P. 15(a) anticipated a single private party's appeal of an 
agency's action requiring that the agency "appear and defend on the 
merits to insure the proper adversarial clash requisite to a xcase 
or controversy'." 514 supra. at 200. The Court went on to note 
Here, there is sufficient adversity between McCord 
[employer] and Mrs. Cephas [employee] to insure proper 
litigation without participation by the Board. To 
require the Board to appear as a party would parallel 
requiring the District Court to appear and defend its 
decision upon direct appeal. Id. 
As with F.R.A.P. 15(a), U.R.A.P. 14(a) does not require that 
the Board be a party to the proceedings for review of its action if 
the private parties to the action are sufficient to "insure the 
proper adversarial clash." Here, BHP and Sam Oil are sufficiently 
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adverse to insure proper litigation without the Board. Moreover, 
since the Board acted solely in a judicial capacity, its 
participation as a party to an appeal of its own order would 
"parallel requiring the District Court to appear and defend its 
decision upon direct appeal." The interests of justice can be 
carried out without the involvement of the Board. 
Likewise, Utah's Administrative Procedures Act requires that 
the agency be named as a respondent. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
14(3)(b). The right of a party to appeal is granted by that act. 
"[A] party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency 
action . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(l) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, for a party to have standing, it must be aggrieved. 
The traditional test for standing requires that the aggrieved 
party "must have suffered some distinct and palpable injury that 
gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal 
dispute'." Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 
P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah 1987). (Association sought review of 
district court closure order pursuant to request for an 
extraordinary writ.) "In addition, an appellant generally must 
show both that he or she was a party or privy to the action below 
and that he or she is aggrieved by that court's judgment." .Id. at 
1171. Although Sam Oil's standing is not in question, the same 
test should apply to the Board; i.e. the Board must show that it 
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would be aggrieved by a reversal of its own decision. 
As argued below, the Board has no particularized interest in 
this matter and will suffer no particularized injury from a 
reversal of its Order. Accordingly, the Board does not satisfy 
traditional standing requirements. 
II, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES PERFORMING AD JUDICATORY FUNCTIONS HAVE 
NO STANDING IN APPEALS FROM THEIR OWN DECISIONS, 
The Board does not dispute the proposition that agencies 
performing adjudicatory functions, when they are not involved in 
protecting a particular public interest, have no standing in 
appeals from their own decisions. There is no Utah authority on 
point. However, this proposition has been addressed in federal 
courts. A series of cases from several federal Circuit Courts of 
Appeal have dealt with the issue of the right of the federal 
Benefits Review Board to participate in appeals of its decisions. 
The Benefits Review Board is a federal agency which has been 
delegated the responsibility for review of decisions of 
administrative law judges under various federal workers' 
compensation programs such as the Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et sea.. and the Black 
Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-924. In essence, the Benefits 
Review Board is an intermediate review tribunal of the decisions of 
administrative law judges in workers' compensation cases under 
federal law. 
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In McCord v. Benefits Review Board, supra, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia granted the Board of Review's 
motion to dismiss it from the appeal. As noted above, the court 
ruled that F.R.A.P. 15(a) was inapplicable since the proper 
adversaries, the employer and employee, were otherwise before the 
court. The court drew a distinction between a party to the 
appellate proceedings and a named respondent. See also, I.T.O. 
Corporation of Baltimore v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080, 
1089 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd. on rehearing, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 
1976), vacated on other grounds, 433 U.S. 904 (1977), aff'd. on 
remand, 563 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1977). (quoting McCord with 
approval). 
In Krolick Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 558 
F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1977), the court considered the Benefits Review 
Board's role under the Black Lung Benefits Act. Relying on 
precedent from the Third Circuit as well as others, including 
McCord, the court held that the Benefits Review Board "occupied a 
purely adjudicatory position analogous to that of the district 
courts in the pre-[Black Lung Benefits Act] review scheme" and 
therefore was not a proper respondent. Id. at 689. 
The principle stated in the foregoing authorities is supported 
by sound reasoning. The traditional test for standing is absent 
when the agency acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. An 
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agency is not aggrieved and has suffered no particular injury by 
reversal of its decision. 
The doctrine of standing is intended to assure the 
procedural integrity of judicial adjudications by 
requiring that the parties to a lawsuit have a sufficient 
interest in the subject matter of the dispute and 
sufficient adverseness that the legal and factual issues 
which must be resolved will be thoroughly explored. 
Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 
798 (Utah 1986). 
Thus, the doctrine of standing limits judicial power so 
that there will not "be a significant inroad on the 
representative form of government, cast[ing] the courts 
in the role of supervising the coordinate branches of 
government . . . [and converting] the judiciary into an 
open forum for the resolution of political and 
ideological disputes about the performance of 
government." Id. at 799. 
In this case, the Board bases its standing on its role of 
overseeing the production of oil and gas resources and the 
protection of the public interest in the development of those 
resources. Board Memorandum at 3. This overbroad statement of 
purpose is not in any way related to the legal and factual issues 
to be resolved in this case. This dispute concerns only the 
interpretation of a contract, the Unit Operating Agreement, to 
which no governmental agency is a party, and whether by that 
contract one private party can exact a penalty from another. This 
dispute does not concern the amounts, manner or location of oil and 
gas production or facilities, any interface between federal/Indian 
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and state interests in mineral reserves, or the creation of federal 
development units. The Board and the public coffers have no 
interest in or right to the payments in dispute. The State of Utah 
has no more interest in this dispute than it would have in a 
dispute between partners over the proceeds of a private business 
venture. 
One of the dangers presented by the Board's involvement is the 
lack of limitation on the scope of the Board's arguments and its 
agenda in making those arguments, as evidenced by the broad and 
irrelevant references to the Board's purposes. That limitation is 
necessary to preclude "political and ideological disputes about the 
performance of government" from the judicial forum. There is no 
public interest to be represented in this dispute beyond the 
public's interest in the correct interpretation and application of 
the law; an interest evident in every dispute adjudicated. The 
Board would not be aggrieved by a reversal of its decision anymore 
than would be a district court. 
Furthermore, the Board's involvement is unwise since it would 
permit improper comment by the tribunal on its own findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The Board's deliberations were made in 
private, like a jury's. Sam Oil has had no right or way to review 
those deliberations or object to them. In determining factual 
issues presented to it, the Board acted as a jury. Accordingly, 
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the Board should have no right to argue, support or comment at 
appeal on its findings of fact or the reasons therefore if not on 
the record. Certainly a juror would have no such right or interest 
in doing so. Indeed, the danger of doing so is made clear in the 
arguments by the Board regarding the credibility of Sam Oil's chief 
witness, Steven A. Malnar. Sam Oil has had no opportunity to 
review the Board's deliberations regarding its credibility 
determinations. Such determinations were not made a part of the 
record or the Board's findings. By commenting on matters off the 
record, the Board is attempting to foreclose this Court's 
independent review of the record. Sam Oil can only comment on the 
record before the Court, not on the private deliberations of the 
Board's members. 
Even more dangerous is the probability that permitting the 
Board to actively participate in appeals from its decisions under 
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 will chill the use of that avenue of 
alternative dispute resolution. Section 40-6-9 permits any party 
entitled to proceeds from oil and gas production to petition the 
Board for a determination by the Board of the justification for the 
payer's withholding of payment. This process is meant to resolve 
disputes between private parties and is essentially a collection 
device for royalty owners and non-operating working interest 
owners. 
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Generally, payees are small landowners with royalty interests 
or small working interests. On the other hand# payers are 
generally large oil and gas development companies. Section 40-6-9 
provides a more level playing field than a civil court for 
resolution of payment disputes between those parties. However, 
payees will be reluctant to use this alternative if the Board 
becomes actively involved in review of its own decisions. The 
Board will be able to bring the whole weight and the great 
resources of the State of Utah to bear on the payee challenging its 
decision. The payee would be wise to sue in court to recover 
payments due since upon review of court decisions, the court itself 
does not enter the fray. Thus# a valuable dispute resolution 
device made available by the Utah legislature will be rendered 
undesirable and fall into nonuse. 
Finally, the Board's involvement in these appellate 
proceedings is absolutely unnecessary. The Board's role was to 
receive evidence, consider the law and render a decision. Beyond 
that, it has no function under § 40-6-9. At the appellate level, 
the parties who have the real interest in this matter, Sam Oil and 
BHP, are well able to present their cases to this Court. Indeed, 
BHP, as the party against whom Sam Oil claims, has an even greater 
interest than the Board in upholding the Board's decision and has 
actively been involved in these proceedings by filing its own 
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brief. Without the Board, the Court still has before it the two 
parties with the most interest at stake in this matter. Since the 
Board has no personal stake in the outcome of this case and there 
are others who have a greater interest in the outcome of the case, 
the Board has no standing. See Terracor v. Utah Board of State 
Lands & Forestry. supra at 799. 
Ill, THE BOARD WAS PERFORMING AN ADJUDICATORY FUNCTION IN HEARING 
AND RULING ON SAM OIL'S PETITION UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S40-6-9. 
As evidenced by the Board's arguments in its memorandum, the 
Board's standing turns on a characterization of its function as 
adjudicatory or administrative. If administrative, it is most 
likely protecting a public interest and therefore would have 
standing. If adjudicatory, it is simply resolving disputes between 
private parties and has no standing in appeals of its orders. 
As a general rule, a governmental body exercising 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, not being a party 
to its proceedings , and not having any legal interest in 
maintaining its determination, is not a party aggrieved 
by a judgment or order reversing its own proceedings, and 
is not entitled to appeal from such judgment or order, or 
to be heard on such appeal, under a statute which in 
general terms authorizes an appeal by any party 
aggrieved; however, in some cases, such a body has been 
held entitled to appeal as a party aggrieved in its 
capacity as a representative of the public interest in 
the matter entrusted to its determination. 
13 ALR4th 1130, 1132, Standing of Zoning Board of Appeals or 
Similar Body to Appeal Reversal of Its Decision. The authorities 
are split on whether zoning boards have standing to appeal. The 
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distinction has generally turned on the court's view of the 
function of the board and whether it was representing a public 
interest. Based on that analysis and the principle that agencies 
performing an adjudicatory function do not have appellate standing, 
the Board should be denied participation in these proceedings. 
Section 40-6-9 is unique in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act 
in that it empowers the Board to arbitrate payment disputes, a 
power distinct from the Board's general powers granted to encourage 
and protect efficient mineral development. For example, the Board 
has jurisdiction to make rules and orders concerning oil and gas 
production facilities and information (§ 40-6-5(2)); to regulate 
operations for and related to the production of oil or gas (§ 40-6-
5(3)); to designate oil and gas pools and wells (§ 40-6-5(4)); to 
regulate injection wells (§ 40-6-5(5)); to hear and rule on 
questions concerning multiple mineral development conflicts with 
oil and gas operations (§ 40-6-5(6)); and to enforce multiple 
mineral development rules (§ 40-6-5(7)). In furtherance of those 
powers, the Board also has authority to establish compulsory oil 
and gas development pools or units, to issue permits for the 
recovery of crude oil from disposal pits, and to conduct hearings 
related thereto. Accordingly, the Board is acting in an 
administrative or enforcement capacity if exercising those powers. 
In contrast, under § 40-6-9 the Board has no authority to act 
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until petitioned by a party entitled to proceeds of production in 
oil and gas. Upon receiving such a petition, the Board is charged 
to investigate and negotiate the matter. Thereafter, if the matter 
cannot be resolved by negotiation, the Board may set a hearing to 
determine if the delayed payment is without reasonable 
justification. If so, it may order an accounting and assess 
penalties and interest. This action arises solely out of Sam Oil's 
petition under § 40-6-9 to address BHP' failure to pay or account 
to Sam Oil for production from the Wasatch No. 6 Well in the 
Roosevelt Unit. 
Section 40-6-9 is "a unique conservation statute in that it 
provides a forum for Board resolution of production payment and 
royalty interest disputes between private parties." D. Dragoo and 
R. Storey, Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation Act of 1983, 5 JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY LAW & POLICY 49, 65. The statute was a re-enactment of 
a prior similar provision that "involved the Board in private 
contractual disputes in which the state had no identifiable 
interest. That remedy was separate and apart from the Board's 
activities regulating the efficient production of the State's oil 
and gas resources." Id. (emphasis added). 
The declaration of public interest set forth in the Oil and 
Gas Conservation Act (§ 40-6-1) supports the broad enforcement and 
administrative powers given to the Board to regulate oil and gas 
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production. That same declaration also supports the adjudicative 
power given to the Board to resolve payment disputes. That 
declaration does not mean that each function served by the Board is 
administrative. Indeed, resolution of payment disputes has nothing 
to do with the manner and means of producing and bringing to market 
the oil and gas sold. Resolution of payment disputes concerns only 
the distribution of dollars received from the sale of the 
production. A quick and inexpensive means of resolving payment 
disputes will encourage landowners to permit production of oil and 
gas resources underlying their lands. In that respect, the 
adjudicative function of the Board serves the public interest. The 
public's interest is in the process, not the result. 
Sam Oil's petition for an accounting had nothing to do with 
prevention of waste, methods of production or even ownership of 
mineral rights. There is no dispute that Sam Oil owned mineral 
rights or that BHP was properly producing oil and gas. This matter 
does not concern wasteful production or the protection of 
correlative rights from drainage. No persons not before the Board 
have any interest in this dispute. The only matter at issue is Sam 
Oil's entitlement to dollars. This matter concerns a simple 
contractual dispute regarding the application of a non-consent 
penalty. In fact, the Board never got to the issue of the 
application of § 40-6-9. "Since Sam Oil is not presently entitled 
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to any payments from BHP because of the application of the 300% 
nonconsent penalty provision, no issue exists as to whether sums 
have been improperly withheld or whether interest or penalties 
under § 40-6-9 are warranted." Conclusion of Law No. 5, April 25, 
1990, Order. (R. 451; Addendum MA" to Petitioner's Brief) 
Finally, BHP should be estopped from arguing that the Board 
was acting in a nonadjudicatory capacity. BHP had filed a federal 
interpleader action in federal district court along with a request 
to enjoin the Board from hearing this matter. BHP also moved the 
Board to dismiss Sam Oil's petition on the grounds that the Board 
had no jurisdiction over this contractual dispute. (R. 221-317) 
BHP contested the Board's authority to act in an adjudicative 
capacity. Now BHP has changed its tune and argues that the Board 
was not acting in an adjudicative capacity. This Court should not 
allow BHP to take such inconsistent positions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board was acting in an adjudicatory capacity. It was not 
representing any particularized public interest in this matter. It 
has suffered no injury and is not an aggrieved person. 
Accordingly, the Board has no standing in these proceedings. 
Dated February 15, 1991. ANDERSON & WATKiNS ANDERSON & WATKi^S 
Steven W. Dougherty, Egjq. 
Attorneys for Sam Oil, Inc 
Petitioner 
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